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The demands of the global war on terror have redefined the roles and requirements for 
Army National Guard Special Forces (ARNG SF). A part-time force, ARNG SF 
nonetheless participates in the full spectrum of ongoing operations making them an 
essential operational component of U.S. Army Special Forces. Despite previous 
operational contributions and future demands for employment; however, ARNG SF is 
underutilized and deficiencies consequently exist with readiness. Analysis of current 
policies, doctrine, guidance and directives reveal critical gaps in strategic guidance and 
force generation processes, contributing to these problems. The ability for ARNG SF to 
contribute strategic depth to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
and United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) can provide balanced 
and integrated special operations capabilities to the nation. But there is a need for 
strategic guidance and changes in the processes under which ARNG SF are utilized. This 
will reduce strains on the active component forces and their families. This thesis 
examines methods for enhancing ARNG SF’s contribution to USSOCOM and USASOC 
operational forces, thereby maximizing capabilities in support of national objectives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: REDEFINING ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 
SPECIAL FORCES AS AN OPERATIONAL FORCE  
The Global War on Terror redefined the roles and requirements for Army 
National Guard Special Forces (ARNG SF) as part of U.S. Special Forces. Although the 
ARNG SF is a part-time force, ARNG SF Soldiers continue to participate in the full 
spectrum of ongoing operations. In 2012, ARNG SF deployed forces as part of 
contingency operations in Central America and Afghanistan.  The 19th and 20th Army 
National Guard Special Forces Groups also conducted 18 Joint Combined Exercises for 
Training (JCET) supporting geographical combatant commanders’ (GCC) theater 
security cooperation (TSC) objectives. In addition, ARNG SF provided homeland 
disaster relief during Hurricane Isaac, rescuing nearly 50 civilians.1   As a consequence 
of heightened operational demands over the past decade of wartime, it is clear that 
ARNG SF is an essential operational component of U.S. Army Special Forces.  
The operational tempo for U.S. Special Forces remains at an unprecedented high 
level, supporting contingencies, theater security operations and emerging requirements.  
Despite previous operational contributions and future demands for employment, 
deficiencies exist with ARNG SF readiness. A 2012 RAND Corporation study requested 
by the USASOC commander highlighted problems with current management of ARNG 
SF missions, training, and resources as insufficient to provide the necessary capabilities 
and proficiency to meet operational demands.2  The authors of the study sought to 
identify and rectify these deficiencies to enhance ARNG SF contributions to ongoing 
operations.  Further evaluation of the current preparedness of ARNG SF to support both 
U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and State requirements has uncovered a 
need for better guidance on the use of ARNG SF. 
                                                 
1 National Guard Bureau, 2014 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement: Sustaining an Operational 
Force (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2013), 
http//:www.nationalguard.mil/features/ngps/2014_ngps.pdf, 19. 
2 Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing 
the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation 2012), iii. 
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A. DUAL ROLE OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES 
ARNG SF constitutes two of the seven U.S. Army Special Forces Groups (SFG) 
(Airborne). The 19th SFG(A) Headquarters is located in Camp Williams, Utah, and 20th 
SFG(A) Headquarters resides in Birmingham, Alabama, respectively. Current ARNG SF 
structure within each group includes a headquarters and headquarters company, three 
subordinate Special Forces battalions and two group support companies. In total, six 
Special Forces battalions, 18 Special Forces companies, six battalion support companies 
and 108 detachments located in 17 different states, also known as “special operations 
forces (SOF) states,” and comprise over 4,300 personnel.3  These units are subordinate to 
the group headquarters, usually located outside their state, to the next higher command 
structure within their respective state. 
ARNG SF force structure and resources are limited; therefore, operational 
requirements must be defined and coordinated between state (Title 32) and federal (Title 
10) missions to prevent overextending the available force. The National Guard, including 
ARNG SF, has dual responsibility for both Title 32 and Title 10 missions. Under Title 32 
U.S. Code, ARNG SF conduct homeland defense (HD) and defense support to civilian 
authority (DSCA) missions responding to disasters, emergencies and matters of 
insurrection under command of the governor.4    
Under Title 10 U.S. Code, ARNG SF contributes to a range of USASOC missions 
supporting USSOCOM strategy, force generation needs, and operational requirements. 
The 19th and 20th SFG(A) are directed to organize, equip, train, validate, and deploy 
forces to conduct special operations across the spectrum of conflict, in support of 
USSOCOM, geographical combatant commanders, American ambassadors, and other 
governmental agencies as directed.5 Balancing the demands of both missions requires 
                                                 
3 Ian Pienik (Major, Special Operations Forces Branch, National Guard Bureau), email message to 
author, November 26, 2013. 
4 Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing 
the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation 2012), 11. 
5 Derek N. Lipson (Lieutenant Colonel, 20th Special Force Group (Airborne)), email message to 
author, October 15, 2013.    
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training, resources and interoperability to produce operationally ready forces. Ensuring 
ARNG SF capabilities and readiness meet the demands of mission requirements 
necessitates balance, achieved through management practices addressing the specific 
operational needs.6 
B. THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IS A “TRUE AND PROVEN 
OPERATIONAL RESERVE”7 
The Army National Guard (ARNG) has been, and is, a cornerstone in the U.S. 
Armed Forces, contributing strategic depth to national defense since its inception. On the 
morning of June 6, 1944, Soldiers of the Virginia Army National Guard assaulted the 
German-controlled Normandy coastline alongside their regular Army partners. From 
inside their landing craft, Soldiers of the 116th Infantry Regiment, heavily armed with 
rifles, automatic weapons, bazookas, mortars, and flamethrowers supported one of the 
largest beach invasions in history. The 116th was just one contingent of a much larger 
National Guard participation totaling 19 divisions representing 49 states in the national 
mobilization for WWII.8 While WWII clearly demonstrated the National Guard’s 
contribution to national defense, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s refusal to mobilize the 
National Guard for the Vietnam War, arguing that it would provoke Soviet and Chinese 
aggression, forced the U.S. government to rely on draftees.9  Many policy experts now 
view this decision as a mistake. Rectifying this mistake, more than 62,000 Army 
Guardsmen were mobilized in support of Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, 
which was the largest mobilization since the Korean War. The ARNG provided direct  
 
 
                                                 
6 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Managing the Reserve Component 
as an Operational Force (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 
Affairs, 2008) 
http://ra.defense.gov/documents/publications/RC%20Operational%20Force%20White%20Paper.pdf, 6. 
7 Jim Greenhill, “Odierno: National Guard Contributions Since 9/11 ‘Critical,’” September 11, 2012, 
http://www.army.mil/article/87056/. 
8 Michael D. Doubler, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 130-1: I Am the Guard: A History of the 
Army National Guard (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 209. 
9 Ibid, 256–261. 
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combat, combat support and combat service support units for extensive service in the 
Persian Gulf. Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield once again demonstrated the 
utility of the National Guard.10    
Following Desert Storm the military faced steep reductions in manpower and 
capabilities. After four major defense reviews in the 1990s, the DoD revised the “Total 
Force” strategy for a balanced active component, National Guard, and reserve force. 
Active duty reductions caused the ARNG to emerge again as a vital part of the Army’s 
combat reserve.11  The ARNG also assumed a more prominent role in domestic missions 
by providing DSCA. In this capacity, the ARNG mobilizes Soldiers as first responders in 
the aftermath of natural disasters and other domestic crises. In 1993, the ARNG 
responded to multiple disasters including Hurricane Andrew and the “Great Flood” of the 
Mississippi River, and even for domestic terrorism such as the Oklahoma City bombing 
on April 19, 1995.12  General Odierno, the Chief of Staff of the Army, stated “our total 
Army has been essential to our plans for the last 11 years: We have a true and proven 
operational reserve, with experience that comes from more than 675,000 mobilizations. 
50 percent of our Guard Soldiers today are combat veterans, many in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. National Guard Soldiers 
continue to provide support to our civil authorities around the nation in a variety of 
missions."13   
As a component of the larger National Guard, ARNG SF have played a vital role 
in stateside and overseas missions over the past 12 years. In September 2005, ARNG SF 
supported civilian authorities following Hurricane Katrina. Members of 19th and 20th 
SFG(A) were among the first responders to the devastated areas along the gulf coast as 
they established an operations center for command and control of military and civilian 
elements. Operational Detachments also conducted search and rescue operations for a 
                                                 
10 Ibid, 330–331. 
11 Ibid, 301–303. 
12 Ibid, 357–359. 
13 Jim Greenhill, “Odierno: National Guard Contributions Since 9/11 ‘Critical,’” September 11, 2012, 
http://www.army.mil/article/87056/. 
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total of 4,207 ground, water, and air rescues from the disaster area. ARNG SF have since 
been called upon to support other disasters including Hurricanes’ Sandy and Isaac in 
2012. ARNG SF personnel also support homeland security operations. Members of 3rd 
Battalion, 20th SFG(A), based in Florida, conduct National Guard counterdrug missions 
working with local and federal law enforcement agencies. The “Counterdrug Operational 
Detachment Alpha” (CODA) has supported local law enforcement operations with 
underwater operations since 1990. The CODA also conducts training for civilian law 
enforcement under the auspices of the counterdrug program.14  In their overseas 
missions, ARNG SF have and continue to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 
Horn of Africa, Central and South America, and other areas of interest.15  As the military 
embarks upon another era of transition, the role of U.S. Special Forces, and ARNG SF in 
particular, is essential. However, ARNG SF’s role has not yet been defined, evidenced by 
the lack of strategic guidance. 
C. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES LACKS A FORCE 
GENERATION MODEL 
As a significant component to the overall Army force structure, the ARNG has a 
formal process for the training, readiness and mobilization of conventional ARNG forces. 
They follow the guidance provided by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) 
utilizing the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process established in Army 
Regulation 525-29. The ARFORGEN process provides specific guidance regarding 
ARNG forces in an operational cycle to ensure maximum readiness and availability of 
forces.16 DoD Directive (DoDD) 1235.10 addresses predictability, deployment-to-dwell 
time, and the development of force generation plans facilitating training and resources to 
                                                 
14 Douglas K. O’Connell, “U.S. Army Special Forces and Homeland Security Operations” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 25–30. 
15 Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing 
the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation 2012), 26. 
16 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 525-29 Military Operations: Army Force Generation 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011), 12. 
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avail the Army with a ready force.17 Following this directive, FORSCOM developed the 
ARFORGEN regulation, which has successfully provided a comprehensive plan for 
conventional ARNG units.18 However, there is a significant gap in this process because 
the ARFORGEN model does not apply to ARNG SF. This gap exists because the 
operational level component command for ARNG SF is United States Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC), not FORSCOM.19  Analysis of Army, ARNG and 
SOF policies, doctrine, guidance and directives reveals a lack of the similar model 
regarding the employment of ARNG SF. Although Army and USSOCOM directed the 
development of a plan for SOF, the proposed plan does not account for ARNG SF, but 
defers to DoDD 1235.10, resulting in a lack of guidance for use of ARNG SF.20 
D. PROBLEM AND SIGNIFICANCE 
ARNG SF’s lack of strategic guidance, along with the operational tempo of U.S. 
Special Forces in existence since 9/11, has caused ARNG SF to remain underutilized 
while active component Special Forces have reached their maximum dwell-to-
deployment ratio established by the Secretary of Defense, while ARNG SF remain 
underutilized.21  Sustained operational use of the U.S. Special Forces requires a “Total 
Force”—active component and the ARNG—approach that includes prudent management 
                                                 
17 Department of Defense, Directive 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the 
Ready Reserve (Change 1) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011). The deployment-to-dwell 
ratio refers to the period a unit is deployed. The period of dwell refers to the time from the demobilization 
date of one involuntary mobilization until the mobilization date of the subsequent involuntary mobilization.   
18 Ibid.  
19 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 10-87: Organization and Functions: Army Commands, 
Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2007), 9–10. 
20 United States Army Special Operations Command, “USASOC Special Operations Force Generation 
(SOFORGEN)” [Information paper] (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, 
2013).    
21 Miguel J. Lezaun (Lieutenant Colonel, Branch Chief, Force Generation and Analysis, United States 
Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; David A. Troutman (GS-14, 
Deputy Chief of Operations, G33, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, 
September 24, 2013; Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Army 
Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, 
Mobilization Officer, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 
23, 2013. 
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of ARNG SF to ensure optimal utilization throughout the Special Forces Community.22  
While ARNG SF is less than one percent of all Army National Guard Soldiers they 
constitute two of the seven Special Forces Groups in the U.S. Army, more than 25 
percent of the U.S. Special Forces manpower.23  ARNG SF is a vital asset that has been 
underutilized. This problem must be rectified. 
Underutilization of ARNG SF negatively affects readiness, which further reduces 
the active component’s interest in employing ARNG SF. Readiness is the determining 
factor in operational deployment sourcing. Operational sourcing is the allocation and 
subsequent assignment of geographic combatant command (GCC) mission requirements 
thereby beginning the process of transitioning ARNG SF from Title 32 to Title 10 active 
federal service. Sourcing determines manning, training and resource requirements 
necessary to maintain operational readiness. Any degradation in readiness results in 
underutilization.24  Underutilization of ARNG SF causes a downward spiral of less 
operational experience, diminishing capabilities, and poor readiness.   
In the research for this paper the author conducted interviews with key leaders, 
staff, advisors and action officers at all levels that validated the current and future 
operational demands for ARNG SF. Interviews confirmed the pressing need for strategic 
guidance on how best to prepare and integrate ARNG SF into future missions. Although 
DoD and Army regulations provide the overarching guidance for the ARNG and Army 
Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), they fail to provide strategic guidance for ARNG 
SF.  Operational sourcing requirements and management for conventional forces include 
                                                 
22 Secretary of the Army, “Army Directive 2012-08 (Total Force Policy),” [Memorandum] 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2008). This document provides the most recent guidance for 
Army’s “Total Force” strategy. Secretary of the Army McHugh’s memo is preceded by Secretary of 
Defense, William Gates, 2007 memorandum establishing the “Total Force” policy—Active Component, 
Reserve Component, and National Guard—for all branches of the armed forces. 
23 National Guard Bureau, 2014 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement: Sustaining an 
Operational Force (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2013), 
http//:www.nationalguard.mil/features/ngps/2014_ngps.pdf, 19.  
24 Randall M. Zeegers (Colonel, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Forces 
Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, 
United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; Scott A. 
Morgan (Sergeant Major, Army National Guard Senior Enlisted Advisor, United States Special Operations 
Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013. 
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conventional ARNG units.  In contrast, ARSOF sourcing and management do not include 
ARNG SF, which are delegated to USASOC. Sourcing requirements for USASOC are 
determined by USSOCOM; however, neither USSOCOM nor USASOC have a policy for 
properly sourcing and managing ARNG SF. In essence, sourcing and managing ARNG 
SF has fallen through the proverbial “crack.” Understanding the Title 10 and Title 32 
hierarchies clarifies the complex command structure for ARNG SF. The National Guard, 
conventional Army, and special operations forces commands each share in the force 
generation responsibilities to produce “trained, ready and cohesive ARNG SF prepared 
for operational deployments.”25  Figure 1 illustrates the ARNG SF command hierarchy.   
 
                                                 
25 United States Special Operations Command, Draft Directive 525-10: Special Forces Force 
Generation (SOFORGEN) (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2012), 3. 
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Figure 1.  ARNG SF Command Hierarchy.26 
                                                 
26 Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing the Contributions of Reserve Component Army 
Special Operations Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2012), 11–12. 
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E. ARNG SF TITLE 10 AND TITLE 32 COMMAND HIERARCHY 
The purpose of Figure 1 is to demonstrate the stakeholders with overlapping 
responsibilities for training, resources, mobilizing, deploying and reconstituting ARNG 
SF. Both Title 10 and Title 32 commands are responsible for identifying mission 
requirements, providing training objectives and resources, and providing oversight to 
ensure ARNG SF achieves optimal readiness to support mission requirements. While 
each level of command has responsibilities for enabling ARNG SF, there are gaps in the 
force generation processes due to lack of synchronization between Title 10 and Title 32 
commands. Figure 1 does not include the lines of communication between all levels of 
command; however, there is a lack of communication among commands, contributing to 
this lack of synchronization. The SOF states’ adjutant generals do not have a common 
understanding of problems affecting ARNG SF in maintaining readiness. SOF states and 
the National Guard Bureau (NGB) are not included in planning conferences for ARNG 
SF employment.27 The active component does not fully understand National Guard 
processes and constraints inhibiting ARNG SF units from continuously maintaining 
operational readiness.28 Consequently, ARNG SF readiness and utilization are not 
optimal for maintaining an operationally ready force.  
F. TITLE 32 COMMAND 
In a Title 32 non-federalized status, 17 SOF states exercise command and control 
over their respective ARNG SF units. Each state’s governor is the commander-in-chief 
                                                 
27 Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special 
Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; Andrew Moreshead (Special Operations 
Branch Chief, National Guard Bureau), interview by author, September 25, 2013; Brett W. Haeussler 
(Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Special Operations Command), interview by 
author, September 20, 2013; Randall M. Zeegers (Colonel, Deputy Commanding General, United States 
Army Special Forces Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Scott A. Morgan (Sergeant 
Major, Army National Guard Senior Enlisted Advisor, United States Special Operations Command), 
interview by author, September 20, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, United States 
Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013.  
28 Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special 
Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; David A. Troutman (GS-14, Deputy 
Chief of Operations, G33, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, 
September 24, 2013; Steven R. Odom (Major, Army National Guard Advisor, United States Army Special 
Forces Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization 
Officer, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013. 
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under non-federalized service and each state’s adjutant general (TAG) is responsible for 
ARNG SF training, resources and readiness according to DoD and Army policy, doctrine, 
and guidance to support state and federal missions. ARNG SF states also support the 
mobilization process by ensuring ARNG SF personnel maintain administrative and 
medical readiness for activation in support of federal mission requirements. ARNG SF 
participates in a variety of Title 32 missions supporting DSCA and National Guard Civil 
Support (NGCS).29  These missions include disaster and crisis response, counter drug 
and command and control. ARNG SF also participates in Joint Combined Exercises for 
Training (JCET), which is a Title 10 requirement, but can be conducted under a Title 32 
status.   
NGB is a staff directorate and operating agency that oversees the administrative 
duties for equipping, organizing, training and mobilization planning for ARNG SF under 
the direction of the Chief of the National Guard.30  The chief is a four star general officer 
representing National Guard forces on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). NGB does not 
have command authority over state National Guard forces. As a staff agency, NGB 
participates with Army staffs in developing policies, programs, concepts and plans 
affecting the ARNG. NGB manages the Title 32 budgeting process to secure funding for 
ARNG SF readiness. As an operating agency, NGB formulates and administers readiness 
programs and acts as a communication channel between all Title 32 and Title 10 
commands responsible for ARNG SF. Communication efforts to enable ARNG SF are 
managed through a variety of Title 10 ARNG SF advisors and liaisons assigned to Title 
10 commands.31  NGB is a link between Title 32 and Title 10 commands for ARNG SF 
sourcing and mobilization processes. 
                                                 




30 Michael D. Doubler, I Am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard (Department of the 
Army Pamphlet No. 130-1) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 151. 
31 John D. Renaud, “National Guard Fact Sheet, Army National Guard (FY2005),” Army National 




G. TITLE 10 COMMAND 
USSOCOM prepares and allocates operational sourcing requirements for ARNG 
SF to support GCCs and theater special operations commands (TSOC).32 USSOCOM is a 
unified combatant command that exercises various service, military department and 
agency-like responsibilities. USSOCOM has the principal functions of organizing, 
training, and equipping forces; building strategies, supporting defense strategic guidance 
and providing combat ready forces to meet the challenges of the current security 
environment.33    
Under a Title 10 federalized status, USSOCOM assumes operational command 
and control over ARNG SF. USSOCOM is the Unified Combatant Command for all SOF 
and the SOF force provider to GCCs; therefore, sourcing for ARNG SF Title 10 missions 
originates at USSOCOM. However, USSOCOM delegates sourcing allocations to the 
USASOC. USASOC is the component command for Army Special Operations Forces 
(ARSOF). The Secretary of the Army (SA) designates operational level command to 
USASOC; therefore, USASOC is responsible for assigning operational sourcing 
requirements, defining training objectives, and providing oversight and evaluation for 
ARNG SF.34 These responsibilities are further delegated to the United States Army 
Special Forces Command (USASFC). Operational sourcing requirements for U.S. Special 
Forces are managed with the “Playbook” sequence, indicating the theater of operation, 
time, unit, and purpose for ARSOF deployments.35 Assigned operational requirements 
for ARNG SF are identified on the Playbook, which represents Annex B of the Global 
                                                 
32 United States Special Operations Command, Draft Directive 525-10: Special Forces Force 
Generation (SOFORGEN) (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2012), 3. 
33 Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN Commander United States Special 
Operations Command before the 113th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee. 1 (2013) (statement of 
William H. McRaven, United States Special Operations Command).  
34 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 10-87: Organization and Functions: Army Commands, 
Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2007), 9–10. 
35 Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing 
the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation 2012), 26–27. 
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Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP).36 FORSCOM, USASOC and USASFC 
are also responsible for the mobilization processes transitioning ARNG SF from Title 32 
to Title 10 active federal service to support GCCs requirements.37   
USASFC developed Policy 90-10, Mobilization and Demobilization, for 
managing ARNG SF in March of 2010 in accordance with guidance outlined in Army 
Regulation 525-29, ARFORGEN. The policy provides information and guidance to 
Special Forces Unit commanders for managing mobilization, training, employment, 
demobilization, and reconstitution of ARNG SF individuals and units.38 USASFC 350-1, 
U.S. Special Forces Active and Army National Guard Component Training, outlines 
training responsibilities, requirements and policies for training and resource 
management.39 Together, USASFC’s 350-1 and 90-10 provide training requirements and 
identify the responsibilities for managing ARNG SF activation; however, neither 
USASFC nor USASOC have established a force generation plan for ARNG SF to 
synchronize training, mobilization and deployment.  
FORSCOM is the Army Service Component Command responsible for training, 
mobilizing, resources, deploying, and reconstituting all assigned conventional Army 
forces to support GCC requirements for operational forces. The ARFORGEN process is 
the methodology FORSCOM uses to manage these responsibilities ensuring forces are 
                                                 
36 Miguel J. Lezaun (Lieutenant Colonel, Branch Chief, Force Generation and Analysis, United States 
Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; David Dluzyn (Senior 
Management Analyst, Future Operations Branch Mobilization and Readiness Division, National Guard 
Bureau), interview by author, September 26, 2013. Global combatant commanders submit requests for 
annual forecasted and emerging requirements through the GFMAP. SOF sourcing requirements are briefed 
to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) daily for approval demonstrating the value of U.S. Special forces 
and ARNG SF operational sourcing.  
37 Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing 
the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation 2012), 27. 
38 United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), Policy 90-10: ARNG Special Forces 
Mobilization Policy (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command (Airborne), 2004), 
i.  
39 United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), Regulation 350-1: U.S. Army Special 
Forces Active and Army National Guard Component Training (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army 
Special Operations Command (Airborne), 2010), i. 
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trained and ready to support GCC requirements.40 Army Regulation 525-29, Army Force 
Generation, prescribes the policies, procedures, and responsibilities for managing, 
preparing, and executing Army force generation. AR 525-29 delegates force generation 
responsibilities for ARSOF to USASOC, because FORSCOM does not determine 
sourcing requirements for ARSOF. While USASOC and USASFC are responsible for 
ensuring ARNG SF units are trained, validated, and resourced to meet SOF readiness 
standards, the mobilization processes transitioning ARNG SF is a collective effort 
between USASOC, FORSCOM, ARNG SF states, and NGB. 
The command structure in Figure 1 is responsible for enabling ARNG SF, but 
guidance for ARNG SF as an operational force remains undefined. Particularly troubling 
is the complexity of the command hierarchy and the different titling authorities which 
obscure the responsibility for guiding ARNG SF. Both Title 32 and Title 10 command 
structures have different policies, programs, concepts, plans and missions. While the 
functions of each command exist to support ARNG SF, the force does not constitute a 
sizeable amount of manpower in comparison to all other forces under these commands. 
However, ARNG SF represents more than one quarter of the U.S. Special Forces 
manpower that is not presently being utilized to its maximum potential. Furthermore, 
operational readiness for ARNG SF is not optimal, while the demand for U.S. Special 
Forces requires the use of all available forces. To summarize, current DoD processes 




The operational capabilities of U.S. Special Forces are degraded by the lack of 
strategic guidance for the operational use of ARNG SF and conflicting and overlapping 
responsibilities of ARNG SF serving two different commands. 
                                                 
40 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 10-87: Organization and Functions: Army Commands, 
Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2007), 2. 
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2. Research Questions 
1) How does the ARNG SF chain of command impact its readiness? 
2) What inhibits ARNG SF from having consistent, predictable and 
continuous operational deployments in support of USSOCOM 
requirements? 
3) What impact do current operational sourcing methods have on ARNG SF 
operational readiness? 
4) Does a lack of strategic guidance impact effective mobilization, training 
and resources? 
5) How can ARNG SF capabilities and readiness be improved? 
The principle means of answering these questions included a review of current 
policies, doctrine and operating procedures, interviews, and personal experience.  Chapter 
II examines strategic guidance, policy and doctrine. The focus of this chapter is to gain an 
understanding of how and why ARNG SF is trained, resourced and employed as an 
operational force. This chapter also examines the current strategic guidance as it pertains 
to ARNG SF operational readiness. Chapter II seeks to identify the gaps in strategic 
guidance limiting the operational readiness and utilization of ARNG SF.  
Chapter III examines training, resources and mobilization processes for ARNG 
SF. This chapter takes a case study approach aimed at identifying the problems with the 
aforementioned processes and in particular, the lack of strategic guidance. The objective 
of chapter III is to investigate the synchronization process between operational 
requirements or missions, mobilization, training, and resources for ARNG SF.   
Chapter IV provides recommendations based upon the analysis of the problems 
discussed in the preceding chapters and the author’s conclusion. This chapter seeks to 
provide solutions to improve ARNG SF capabilities and readiness by developing 
strategic guidance for a fully operational ARNG SF. Chapter IV also seeks to clarify 
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II. STRATEGIC GUIDANCE POLICY AND DOCTRINE 
Developing strategic guidance for the operational use of the ARNG SF will 
provide interoperability with active component Special Forces as well as strategic depth 
for SOF in achieving their objectives. Excluding ARNG SF in regular operational 
mission cycles perpetuates negative supply-demand ratios, strains the active force,  
stresses families and adversely hurts ARNG SF training and operational readiness. With 
proper strategic guidance, ARNG SF is capable of enhancing USSOCOM and USASOCs 
accomplishment of national objectives. Therefore, United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) and United States Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC) need to provide clear, straightforward guidance and incorporate ARNG SF in 
“Total Force” planning and deployments. 
A. THE NEED FOR STARTEGIC GUIDANCE IN THE “TOTAL FORCE” 
CONCEPT 
The total force concept of active, reserve and National Guard components 
continues to be the defense construct for the United States military. Since 9/11, the 
National Guard has demonstrated it is a capable and ready operational force. Future 
challenges will continue to require a balance of active component and National Guard to 
sustain the operational tempo and preserve the readiness of the total force.41 However, 
past utilization of ARNG SF have not fully supported the DoD total force concept and the 
objectives outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). Reviewing current 
guidance, standard operating procedures and proposed future doctrine reveals the 
exclusion of ARNG SF in key planning considerations. First, USSOCOM and USASOC 
strategic guidance does not specifically address the inclusion of ARNG SF. Second, 
USSOCOM’s campaign plan, which establishes a global network providing a matrix for 
sourcing special operations forces (SOF), does not include ARNG SF. Third, without 
including ARNG SF, USASOC’s methods for managing operational deployments do not 
                                                 
41 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, 3–8. 
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provide balanced, sustainable and fully integrated special operations capabilities to 
geographical combatant commanders’ (GCC). Fourth, USSOCOM and USASOC draft 
force generation concepts do not include ARNG SF.  
The 2012 DSG provides the basis for guidance and policies for USSOCOM and 
USASOC to utilize of ARNG SF. The 2012 DSG also establishes a blueprint for the 
military as it embarks upon a period of transition following ten years of contingency 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States military is downsizing and yet it 
must retain the capabilities to accomplish national objectives. As the force downsizes, 
operational requirements are increasing in support of GCCs; consequently, innovative 
and low-cost approaches are necessary to achieve security objectives. Toward this 
objective, establishing and maintaining relationships with allies and partner nations 
enables the U.S. to counter threats in an efficient and effective manner. The DSG outlines 
the guiding principles for a capable and relevant Joint Force of 2020, among which the 
force must be structured to protect capabilities, intellectual capital and force structure 
necessary to attain future unforeseen policy objectives.42 Following the pathway from 
national strategic objectives to the use of ARNG SF shows the current disconnect 
between Special Forces operational requirements and the forces needed to efficiently 
handle the workload.  
B. SOF STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES DO NOT SUPPORT AN 
OPERATIONAL RESERVE 
Effectively using the ARNG SF begins with an analysis of the overall 
requirements placed on the USSOCOM by the GCCs plus USSOCOM’s own global 
operating concepts. Establishing the SOF strategic objectives for ARNG SF originates 
with USSOCOM. USSOCOM is the Unified Combatant Command for all special 
operations forces. It develops all special operations guidance. USSOCOM developed 
SOCOM 2020 providing strategic direction for SOF, focusing on four major initiatives 
intended to prepare SOF for current and future requirements.  USSOCOM initiatives 
include winning the current fight, building capacity and relationships, preservation of the 
                                                 
42 Ibid, 3–8. 
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force and families and responsive resources, which are the lines of effort linking national 
strategic objectives to the force and the individual operator.43 USSOCOM’s guidance 
establishes the processes by which subordinate commands assign missions. ARNG SF is 
subordinate to USASOC. 
USASOC provides trained and ready Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 
to GCCs to support national objectives. Building upon the DSG and USSOCOM’s 
strategic guidance, USASOC developed ARSOF 2022 to identify strategic priorities for 
ARSOF and provide a blueprint describing six priorities necessary to meet current and 
future challenges. First, ARSOF will support GCC operational requirements with diverse, 
regionally expert and highly trained forces. To accomplish this, USASOC will invest in 
and optimize human capital by recruiting, educating, and retaining highly capable 
Soldiers. A critical component of human capital is USASOC’s focus on preservation of 
forces and their families. Second, ARSOF will optimize the interdependence between 
SOF, conventional forces (CF), and U.S. governmental agencies providing the nation 
with seamless combat power. Failure to properly use regionally expert forces in reserve is 
neither prudent, nor judicious. Therefore, as its third priority, USASOC will maximize 
the use of all ARSOF to conduct sustainable special operations. Fourth, USASOC will 
integrate ARSOF into campaign plans and leverage capabilities at the operational level. 
Restructuring outdated command and control structures through the establishment of 
scalable and deployable contingents, called “nodes,” of SOF manpower, is USASOC’s 
fifth priority. Providing sufficient resources to meet SOF objectives will maximize 
operational support to GCCs and theater special operations commands (TSOC). Finally, 
the sixth priority in USASOC’s blueprint is adapting and optimizing technologies and 
resources to meet global SOF mission requirements. The six initiatives outlined in 
ARSOF 2022 provide the basis for adapting and optimizing ARSOF as it transitions to 
meet the demands of the next decade and beyond. USASOC’s commitment to provide 
                                                 
43 United States Special Operations Command, SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear (Tampa, 
FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013), 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf, i. 
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balanced and fully integrated special operations capabilities to the nation requires a total 
force approach in which ARNG SF will continue to play a vital role. 44 
Maximizing ARNG SF as an operational reserve to meet USSOCOM and 
USASOC objectives requires well developed guidance. Analysis of the SOCOM 2020 
and ARSOF 2022 strategic guidance reveals that ARNG SF is not included in the 
strategic planning. USSOCOM’s strategic direction outlined in the SOCOM 2020 
publication does not address the use of NG or RC SOF. USASOC’s ARSOF 2022 
acknowledges that ARNG SF represents two of the seven Special Forces Groups (SFG), 
but it does not provide guidance regarding how these forces fit into the current and future 
operational picture. The sixth principle discussed in the 2012 DSG identifies National 
Guard and reserve component forces as “combat proven” having consistently 
demonstrated readiness and being essential for protracted special operations. 
Transitioning “Toward the Joint Force of 2020” requires sustained use of National Guard 
and reserve component forces, including ARNG SF.45 Neither SOCOM 2020 nor 
ARSOF 2022 provide straightforward direction for current and future operational use of 
ARNG SF although DoD directive (DoDD) 1200.17 and DoDD 1235.10 state this 
requirement.46 ARNG SF provides over 4,300 Special Forces personnel, but these 
personnel are not being optimally incorporated in the current or future operations. 
Because “special operations forces cannot be mass produced,” neglecting to incorporate 
ARNG SF has and will continue to result in degradation of capabilities and readiness 
within SOF until USSOCOM and USASOC provide clear guidance establishing how to 
utilize ARNG SF. Optimizing their contributions in SOF’s operational picture must be 
accomplished. 
                                                 
44 United States Army Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022 (Fort Bragg, NC: United States 
Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 18–23. 
45 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, 6–8. 
46 Department of Defense, Directive [DoDD] 1235.10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization 
of the Ready Reserve [Change 1], September 21, 2011; DoDD 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Component 
as an Operational Force.     
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C. USSOCOM CAMPAIGN PLANNING DOES NOT INCLUDE ARNG SF 
In 2013, USSOCOM developed a campaign plan (CAMPLAN), in which ARNG 
SF have no operational assignment leaving the role of ARNG SF unclear. The intent of 
this CAMPLAN is to build a global SOF network (GSN), which strengthens 
interoperability between U.S. Government agencies, allies, and partner nation forces to 
achieve global security objectives. To provide greater interoperability, the GSN 
CAMPLAN rebalances SOF manpower, providing GCCs with increased capacity and 
capabilities. U.S. Special Forces are vital to the success of the GSN CAMPLAN. The five 
active U.S. SFG’s are assigned regional ellipses of responsibility supporting GCC 
forecasted theater campaign plans and emerging contingency requirements. However, 
ARNG SF Groups are not assigned regional responsibilities although ARNG SF 
battalions are regionally aligned. GCC operational requirements within these regional 
ellipses will be assigned to the Active Component SFGs; however, ARNG SF will likely 
not be tasked with any operational requirements. This means ARNG SF does not have 
any projected involvement in the GSN CAMPLAN. ARSOF 2022 states, regionally 
aligned forces in reserve should be synchronized in support of global special operations 
mission requirements.47  Although the GSN CAMPLAN implies intent to synchronize 
ARNG SF’s role with the active component, it does not provide a method to employ this 
asset. 
USSOCOM’s ability to achieve the goals set forth in SOCOM 2020 requires a 
total force approach, synchronizing efforts and maximizing capabilities; therefore, 
integrating ARNG SF into mission-planning adds two more Special Forces Groups to 
achieve these goals. Adding over 4,300 Special Forces personnel to the GSN force pool 
will reduce stress on the active component. “Success is ultimately rooted in how well we 
take care of our most precious resource—the SOF warriors and their families.”48  
Preservation of force and families is USSOCOM’s third major initiative, which is aimed 
                                                 
47 United States Army Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022 (Fort Bragg, NC: United States 
Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 21. 
48 United States Special Operations Command, SOCOM 2020: Forging the Tip of the Spear (Tampa, 
FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013), 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf, 2–3.  
 22 
at “reducing stress due to lack of predictability and demanding operational tempos 
exacerbated by significant time away from home.”49  The GSN CAMPLAN is expected 
to increase deployment predictability for active component service members but not for 
ARNG SF.50 Without assigning ARNG SF predictable operational cycles, the onus of 
fulfilling mission requirements must be accomplished by the active component. Using 
ARNG SF predictably and consistently as an integrated contributor to the force structure 
in the GSN CAMPLAN will reduce stress placed upon forces and families. 
D. THE SUPPLY OF SOF MANPOWER DOES NOT MEET OPERATIONAL 
DEMANDS 
The Global SOF Network CAMPLAN requires a significant, sustained use of the 
force over time. In addition to mission requirements in support of GCC campaign plans 
and emerging contingencies, the GSN CAMPLAN requires U.S. Special Forces 
manpower to support multiple “nodes” and individual advisor/liaison personnel. Special 
Operations command forwards (SOCFWD) are forward deployed command nodes that 
will link TSOCs with tactical units to increase operational effectiveness. The GSN 
CAMPLAN also calls for regional SOF coordination centers (RSCC) to work with 
GCCs, TSOCs, U.S. Governmental agencies and partner nations to improve training, 
education, coordination, information sharing and interoperability. Sustaining deployed 
forces will be accomplished through forward deployed “logistics nodes” that are 
connected with U.S-based logistics and forward deployed SOF. The GSN CAMPLAN 
will also increase the requirements for individual liaisons and advisors including Special 
Operations liaison officers (SOLOs) to represent USSOCOM and serve as advisors at 
U.S. embassies. Current manpower limitations to support GSN CAMPLAN requirements 
are likely to hinder the execution of the concept.51 The manpower requirements to 
support the GSN CAMPLAN exceed the current capacity of active duty forces. Over 50 
                                                 
49 Ibid, 6. 
50 Ibid, 5–6. 
51 United States Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces: The Global SOF Network. 
You Can’t Surge Trust (Tampa, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013), 7–11. 
 23 
percent of current GCC theater security cooperation (TSC) requirements are not executed 
due to force structure limitations and the high demand for U.S. Special Forces.52  
The impending withdrawal of most U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2014 may 
provide additional manpower to support the GSN CAMPLAN, but budgetary and force 
structure reductions will counter the gains due to shifting mission priorities. Active 
Component Army is expecting reductions by as many as 80,000 personnel due to the 
$487 billion dollars in budgetary reductions in response to the 2011 Budget Control 
Act. 53 SOF is expected to see a 12 percent reduction as a result of these cutbacks and the 
SOF recruiting pool will also likely be reduced.54 This decrease is even more dramatic 
when coupled with the attrition rate in the force. Nevertheless, of the total ARNG SF 
force structure, only 4.5 percent is currently engaged in operations.55 Incorporating 
ARNG SF into the CAMPLAN will help mitigate the effects of downsizing.     
E. USASOC’S “PLAYBOOK” SEQUENCE DOES NOT INCLUDE ARNG SF 
USASOC is adapting the force to provide balanced and fully integrated special 
operations capabilities, yet current and future operational deployment sourcing does not 
specifically include ARNG SF.56 USASOC is the service component command providing 
ARSOF to support USSOCOM and GCC requirements. Assignment of missions to 
support these requirements is managed by USASOC’s “Playbook” sequence, which is a 
long-range planning calendar that graphically depicts the forecasted operational mission 
requirements for ARSOF over a five-year period. The ARSOF sourcing process begins 
when USASOC announces the operational requirements to subordinate commands, 
                                                 
52 George Frazier (United States Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 
2013; David A. Troutman (GS-14, Deputy Chief of Operations, G33, United States Army Special 
Operations Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013.   
53 Erin Banco, “Army to Cut its Forces by 80,000 in Five Years,” New York Times, June 25, 2013, 
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54 Brett W. Haeussler (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Special Operations 
Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013. 
55 Miguel J. Lezaun (Lieutenant Colonel, Branch Chief, Force Generation and Analysis, United States 
Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013. 
56 United States Army Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022 (Fort Bragg, NC: United States 
Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 3. 
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including United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC), during force 
generation conferences. USASFC manages the “playbook” sequence for U.S. Special 
Forces and assigns mission requirements to the subordinate Special Forces Groups.57 
Current playbook sequencing does not provide predictable mission requirements for 
ARNG SF deployments as stated in the ARSOF 2022 and SOCOM 2020 objectives. At 
this time, ARNG SF does not have any assigned overseas missions on the Playbook 
beyond the spring of 2014.58 To meet the operational demands of the Playbook, provide 
predictability and preserve forces and families, operational cycles for ARNG SF should 
be established in accordance with USSOCOM initiatives and DoD directives. 
F. DWELL-TO-DEPLOMENT RATIOS DO NOT MEET SECDEF 
GUIDANCE 
The disparity between active component and ARNG SF deployments and the 
duration between these deployments further highlights the need to create a synchronized, 
cyclic schedule of ARNG SF based upon the playbook. Active component Special Forces 
are currently operating at a 1:.68 dwell-to-deployment ratio exceeding the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) goal of 1:2.59 In other words, for every 365 days that active 
component Special Forces personnel are deployed, their dwell time at home station is 249 
days, which exceeds the guidance of one year deployed with two years at home station. 
This high operational tempo for active component Special Forces reduces readiness and 
increases stress on troops and families. The average number of deployments for Special 
Forces qualified personnel in ARNG SF is only 1.36 deployments and 0.74 for ARNG SF 
                                                 
57 Matthew E. Boyer, John E. Peters, and Brian Shannon, National Guard Special Forces: Enhancing 
the Contributions of Reserve Component Army Special Operations Forces (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
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support personnel.60 On average, ARNG SF personnel have only deployed twice in more 
than 12 years. One ARNG SF unit has a dwell-to-deployment ratio of one year deployed 
with nine years at home station.61 The SECDEF’s dwell-to-deployment goal for National 
Guard and Reserve Component forces is 1:5; therefore, the average number of 
deployments for ARNG SF personnel can increase significantly and still meet the 
SECDEF’s guidance.62 Consequently, the current Playbook sequence does little to 
efficiently balance and integrate U.S. Special Forces capabilities in support of 
USSOCOM and GCCs. In essence, increasing the use of ARNG SF to the fullest intent of 
the SECDEF’s guidance will reduce stress on the active component, while enhancing the 
operational readiness of ARNG SF. 
G. FORCE GENERATION PLANNING DOES NOT INCLUDE ARNG SF 
To meet operational demands with trained, resourced, and ready forces both 
USSOCOM and USASOC developed force generation processes to provide greater 
predictability, synchronization, and operational continuity. However, neither plan 
incorporates ARNG SF. In 2011, USASOC developed a Special Operations Forces 
Generation (SOFORGEN) concept to better address predictability, ad hoc sourcing 
solutions, and increased widespread stress on the force. The SOFORGEN concept is a 
supply-based process using the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle designed to 
provide GCCs with special operations forces that are trained and ready with regional 
expertise. The USASOC commanding general and USSOCOM commander directed 
development of the SOFORGEN concept; however, this concept has not been approved 
for implementation. Under key planning assumptions, ARNG SF was specifically “not 
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currently included” in the model.63 Neglecting to include ARNG SF in this concept 
reinforces the notion that ARNG SF is an afterthought for operational planning.64Among 
the listed reasons for implementing USASOCs SOFORGEN concept include dwindling 
resources requiring more effective prioritization.65 Any special operations force 
generation model needs to include ARNG SF if global requirements are to be met.  
USSOCOM and USASOC strategic guidance both state that people are the most 
vital resource, yet the USASOC’s SOFORGEN plan does not support the predictability 
and readiness for ARNG SF personnel and their families. Overseas contingency 
operations have exceeded the supply of ARSOF forces for over seven years, which is 
another reason why USASOC developed its SOFORGEN concept. According to the 
SOFORGEN fact sheet, anecdotal and statistical evidence also indicates that ARSOF has 
experienced increased and widespread “stress on the force.”66 Integrating ARNG SF with 
consistent and predictable deployments will relieve stress on the force. According to 
survey data found in a study completed by the RAND Corporation in 2012, 62 percent of 
ARNG SF personnel prefer a dwell to deployment ratio of 1:3 and 15 percent preferred a 
1:4, which is at or below the recommended surge dwell-to-deployment ratio.67 This 
demonstrates that ARNG SF wants to deploy and can be included in the SOFORGEN 
concept. In a supply-demand based model in which ARNG SF constitutes more than 25 
percent of available U.S. Special Forces manpower, not including ARNG SF in the model 
significantly reduces the force pool and unnecessarily stresses the active component.  
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USSOCOM also produced a draft SOFORGEN directive providing guidance to 
subordinate SOF service component commands, which does not support the operational 
use or readiness of ARNG SF. USSOCOM’s SOFORGEN plan is intended to generate 
fully capable and enabled SOF packages on a predictable, sustainable basis in support of 
GCC requirements.68 The means by which the SOFORGEN directive proposes to meet 
GCC demand for forces is through a cyclical process. This process is similar to the 
ARFORGEN cycle, employing three progressive phases, or “pools:” reset, train/ready, 
and available forces. Figure 2 illustrates the SOFORGEN “force pool concept” and 
identifies the activities for active component forces in each pool. 69 This construct does 
not work for ARNG SF for two reasons. First, it is based upon a three year rotation cycle 
that is below the 1:5 deployment-to-dwell ratios for ARNG SF. Second, ARNG SF lacks 
consistent and predictable sourcing of operational requirements; therefore, it is unable to 
implement the force pool concept. In essence, the “force pool concept” does not support 
ARNG SF operational readiness.  
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Figure 2.  SOFORGEN “Force Pool Concept”70 
USSOCOM’s draft SOFORGEN directive does not provide clear guidance for 
managing ARNG SF sourcing as an operational force. Chapter II illustrates specific 
guidance for USASOC’s management of operational deployment sourcing, training, and 
resources. However, this section does not address the use of RC SOF.71  Chapter III 
delivers three lines of effort for service components, including USASOC, for managing, 
preparing, and building forces to support GCC requirements. The force management 
section describes the variety of efforts for identifying, prioritizing, and sourcing forces 
with operational deployments.72  Tracking RC dwell-to-deployment ratios is discussed in 
this section; however, the draft directive does not address RC deployment sourcing as an 
operational force for sustained, steady state, rotations to support ongoing operational 
requirements. Predictable use of RC forces with a sustainable dwell-to-deployment ratio 
of 1:5, or 1:4 under surge conditions, is the definitive operational guidance to meet global 
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demands.73  Without clear guidance for operational deployment sourcing, preparation 
and building lines of effort will neither produce, nor sustain RC SOF operational 
capabilities to support current and future requirements. Consequently, the proposed 
SOFORGEN cycle will not support the train-mobilize-deploy model in providing 
resourced, trained, ready, and available RC SOF in compliance with the Secretary of 
Defense’s guidance in DoD 1235.10. Unless the draft SOFORGEN plan is amended to 
incorporate RC forces, ARNG SF will remain an underutilized force and readiness will 
be degraded. 
H. OPERATIONALIZING ARNG SF REQUIRES CHANGES TO FUNDING 
PROCESSES 
Funding constraints require adapting processes to enable the use of ARNG SF. 
Funding is the number one issue precluding operational deployment sourcing.74 Because 
funding is the key to all processes, it is critical that funds are requested to facilitate 
training, resources and operational support to GCC requirements. Over the past decade, 
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding enabled the mobilization of ARNG SF 
for support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and 
Operation New Dawn (OND). Although OCO funding of $450 billion is projected 
through 2021 for deployments in support of contingency operations, these funds are 
being reduced and will affect the employment of ARNG SF.75 All military services are 
transferring OCO funding to their base budgets, which requires programming of monies 
(POM) through the DoD budget process. To accomplish this, Services must forecast 
funding based upon historical trends and projected GCC requirements. In anticipation of 
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OCO reductions and USSOCOMs enduring global presence, Admiral McRaven 
requested $2.6 billion dollars to transition OCO funding to USSOCOM’s base budget 
when he addressed Congress in March 2012.76 USSOCOM’s base budget will enable 
future operational use of ARNG SF through a new titling authority.  
As OCO funding is reduced, the DoD is also transitioning to a new titling 
authority for employing RC forces to support operational requirements. In 2012, 
Congress approved Section 12304(b) Title 10 (USC), Combatant Command Support 
Activation, specifically for employing RC forces for “preplanned missions in support of a 
combatant commands.” Activations under 12304(b) are “not designed for emerging 
requirements for humanitarian missions, but rather to enhance the use of reserve 
component units that organize, train and plan to support operational mission requirements 
to use the same standards as active component units under service force generation plans 
in a cyclic period, and predictable manner.” 77 ARNG SF activation costs under 12304(b) 
must also be forecasted by USSOCOM and USASOC in their base budgets. USSOCOM 
and USASOC requested over 900 man-years of funding for fiscal years (FY) 2015 
through 2019 to support operational use of ARNG SF. DoD also approved USSOCOM 
and USASOC’s funding request for ARNG SF.78 Despite requests and subsequent 
approval of 12304(b) funding, ARNG SF does not have any forecasted requirements.  
Changes to enable ARNG SF mobilizations will increase manpower, thus overall 
strengthening the Global SOF Network. USSOCOM’s budget accounts for 1.7 percent of 
the overall proposed DoD budget for 2013 and constitutes less than four percent of the 
total DoD budget. USSOCOM plans to continue with its programmed manpower 
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growth.79 Consistently POMing 12304(b) funding for ARNG SF is a cost effective 
solution for managing the supply of forces to meet operational demands with trained and 
ready forces. ARNG SF manpower already exists. Allowing ARNG SF capabilities and 
readiness to atrophy due to inadequate resources is contrary to USSOCOMs fourth line of 
operations, which is responsive resource allocation to ensure forces are appropriately 
trained, equipped, and educated.80 Although funding is a limiting factor for the use of 
ARNG SF, all forces are constrained in this manner. If operational requirements to 
support GCCs and TSOCs are approved for execution funding will be made available. 
Lack of consistent and predictable operational sourcing prevents ARNG SF from 
receiving funding. USSOCOM and USASOC must assign operational requirements for 
ARNG SF and project funding through the budget process to ensure ARNG SF is an 
operationally ready and fully integrated force. Funding to enable the use of all available 
manpower requires forecasting and optimizing the use of all available capabilities to 
provide balanced and fully integrated capabilities for operational requirements. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Developing a construct for the future use of SOF necessitates the full participation 
of the total force in a period when the need to exercise economy of force is paramount. 
The ability of ARNG SF to contribute strategic depth to USSOCOM and USASOC 
endeavors toward providing balanced and integrated special operations capabilities to the 
nation, while offsetting the active component’s strained force and family, calls for a 
change in the processes under which ARNG SF are utilized. Better strategic guidance for 
ARNG SF, to include an efficient and effective force generation plan, will increase the 
manpower pool as force providers analyze the overwhelming demand for U.S. Special 
Forces. Excluding ARNG SF, a force already built and available, affects not only the 
active component, but perpetuates a downward spiral of degrading capabilities, readiness 
and underutilization within ARNG SF. 
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III. ARNG SF TRAINING, RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND 
MOBILIZATION 
Strategic guidance enables Army National Guard Special Forces (ARNG SF) to 
develop mission focused training. As per DoD Directive 1235.10, force providers shall 
establish predictability for the Reserve component, including ARNG SF, through defined 
operational cycles using a train-mobilize-deploy model with “rotationally-ready” units as 
the outcome.81 Without guidance for operational cycles and placement of ARNG SF 
units in a force generation plan, training development cannot be synchronized with a 
clear vision of forecasted mission profiles. As a consequence, ARNG SF units notified of 
an operational sourcing requirement under a compressed timeframe will require 
additional post-mobilization time, training, resources and personnel to achieve 
operational readiness. 
A. ARNG SF MOBILIZATION 
Following notification of operational deployment sourcing, ARNG SF units begin 
preparation for deployment through the pre-mobilization process. Mobilization is the 
process of activating National Guard forces “in support of operational missions, in 
contingencies, during national emergencies, or in time of war.”82 The mobilization 
process enables the employment of part-time National Guard forces to support federal 
Title 10 mission requirements in a full time status. As described in Chapter I, ARNG SF 
mobilizations involve transitioning ARNG SF from Title 32 state command and control 
to Title 10 federal command and control to support Special Operations Forces mission 
requirements. The mobilization process for ARNG SF entails the identification of 
operational requirements or missions, approval process for mobilizing ARNG SF forces, 
training, allocating resources, demobilization, and reconstitution of forces. 
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B. VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATIONS AFFECT CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT 
The numerous planning considerations to mobilize an ARNG SF unit can be 
mitigated with advanced notification and planning. In addition to pre-mobilization tasks, 
ARNG SF Soldiers need to inform civilian employers of upcoming deployments. To 
further clarify how this impacts mission readiness, understanding the impact deployments 
have on Soldiers’ civilian jobs needs to be identified. The Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) requires civilian employers to 
support both voluntary and involuntary deployments of ARNG SF. USERRA protects 
civilian job rights and benefits for veterans and members of Reserve components. 
USERRA also makes major improvements in protecting service member rights and 
benefits by clarifying the law, improving enforcement mechanisms, and adding Federal 
Government employees to those employees already eligible to receive Department of 
Labor assistance in processing claims.83 
Regardless of USERRA, civilian employers have a negative perception of 
voluntary mobilizations, which impacts the decisions of ARNG SF personnel in 
volunteering for a mission. Providing ARNG SF units with deployment predictability 
embedded in a force generation plan will enable ARNG SF Soldiers to anticipate 
absences from civilian employment prepare employers and increase civilian employer’s 
support of military deployments. Unpredictability of missions and the necessity to 
volunteer has essentially limited ARNG SF Soldiers’ ability to participate in missions, 
ultimately diminishing readiness and unit integrity. 
C. VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATIONS DEGRADE UNIT READINESS 
ARNG SF Unit readiness is degraded when units receive requests, or feasibility 
assessments, to voluntarily support operational requirements. These missions vary from 
individual augmentees to fill active component shortages to organic ARNG SF units in 
support of operational requirements. As an example, if feasibility assessments are 
generally supported internally by greater than 75 percent of required ARNG SF 
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manpower to fill the operational requirement, the remaining portion must be filled with 
personnel from other units. In most instances, the remaining 25 percent of personnel do 
not volunteer for these missions because of the impact voluntary activations have on 
civilian employment. Feasibility assessments put ARNG SF personnel in a compromising 
position with family and employers. When individuals do not volunteer for operational 
requirements, units request support from other ARNG SF units, in a process known as 
“cross-leveling,” to fill vacancies to meet manning requirements. 
Involuntary mobilizations increase cross-leveling, resulting in cannibalization and 
degradation of ARNG SF readiness. Cannibalization occurs when ARNG SF personnel 
from one unit deploy with another unit thus degrading the manpower of the non-
deploying unit. Cross-leveling sends units into a spiral of perpetual degradation that will 
ultimately leave ARNG SF incapable of deploying as an organic unit. ARNG SF 
readiness is degraded with cross-leveling. ARNG SF units will continue to draw 
personnel from one another until the point is reached when units are no longer able to 
operate cohesively. In essence, ARNG SF becomes a hollow force by supporting the 
active component with individual augmentees. According to DoDD 1235.10, cross-
leveling shall be minimized and alternate methods must be used to fill manpower 
shortages.84 ARNG SF units need involuntary mobilizations to maintain unit integrity 
and readiness. 
D. CHALLENGES IN TRAINING MANAGEMENT 
The training management process (TMP) for ARNG SF is based upon a 12- to 24-
month cycle. The Army training management process is used by leaders to plan, prepare, 
execute and assess training in preparation for operational deployments. The first step in 
the TMP is the battle focused analysis (BFA) to plan and execute training ensuring it is 
focused on the operational objectives to best support GCC requirements. Among the 
objectives included in the BFA are familiarizing operational elements with mission 
requirements and assigned areas of operation, requesting and allocating resources, and 
developing 12 to 24-month training plans. After conducting a BFA, units develop a 
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mission essential task list (METL) containing the specified and implied tasks to support 
GCC operational requirements. Units further develop individual and collective tasks to 
support their METL. Finally, command training guidance provides a common focus and 
directions for unit training.85 The key component in the training management process is 
identification of operational requirements enabling subordinate commanders and staff to 
plan, prepare, and execute mission focused training. Without assigned missions or 
consistent regional alignment, ARNG SF readiness may not be focused on a potential 
deployment and therefore is degraded. 
In the absence of definitive operational requirements or a force generation plan 
based on a predictable deployment agenda, units base training on doctrinal requirements, 
command guidance and the TMP. Specified guidance for the use of ARNG SF as an 
operational force seated in an operational cycle enables ARNG SF to develop mission 
focused training objectives while progressing to achieve operational readiness. Unit 
readiness and morale are enhanced when Soldiers know their training is mission focused 
and has relevance, which comes from having a defined operational deployment. ARNG 
SF continues to meet training objectives, but training is not optimal because training and 
resources are not synchronized with operational requirements. 
E. LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IS DEGRADED BY LACK OF 
CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY 
In addition to training issues, the 2012 RAND study identifies deficiencies in 
ARNG SF language proficiency. ARNG SF has a wide variety of language capabilities 
with limited proficiency. 24 percent of tested personnel in 19th Special Forces Groups 
(SFG) (Airborne) and 64 percent of 20th SFG(A) tested personnel qualified with the 
lowest measurable rating of language proficiency, while 43 percent of personnel tested in 
19th SFG(A) and 16 percent of tested personnel in 20th SFG(A) scored in the highest 
category of language proficiency. The authors cite two reasons for the disparity in 
language proficiency. First, language skills throughout U.S. Special Forces have been 
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affected by the multiple deployments outside of their assigned geographical regions since 
2001. Second, language proficiency in 19th and 20th SFG(A) is undermined by geographic 
reorientations and realignments thus changing the language requirements.86 Since 2000, 
the operational alignment for 20th SFG(A) changed three times, with a proposed fourth 
change in January 2013. 87 In essence, since 2000 a member of 20th SFG(A) may have 
been trained in over four different languages based upon changing geographical 
orientation.  
According to Regulation 350-1, “Regional Orientation is a hallmark of Special 
Forces Soldiers and units. Commanders will aggressively focus on regional orientation in 
terms of language, environmental, and cultural training requirements.”88 According to the 
RAND study, there is residual cynicism about language training due to realignments and 
reorientations.89 This cynicism is based upon the unrealistic expectation that part-time 
forces are able to maintain language proficiency even when the capability requirements 
change multiple times in a short duration. Moreover, ARNG SF is expected to maintain 
the same standards as the active component, yet regional alignment for the active 
component remains consistent.  
F. TRAINING AFTER NOTIFICATION OF SOURCING 
ARNG SF units are required to conduct individual, small unit and collective 
training, administrative and maintenance requirements; in addition to all state directed 
tasks and training requirements. Therefore, training during monthly weekend drill and 
15-day annual training periods must be maximized. As an example, ARNG SF units are 
required to conduct Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC) training every 
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three years and once within the year prior to deployment.90 If a unit receives notification 
of an operational deployment sourcing one year prior to mobilization, but conducted 
SFAUC training the previous year, the training would have to be conducted again.  Had 
the unit planned the training under a force generation reset/train/ready model, this 
training would have been placed on the training schedule within the year the unit received 
notification of sourcing.  The result is a “knee jerk reaction” to training requirements 
whereby units assume risk because forces are unable to accomplish all necessary training 
requirements. Furthermore, duplication of training costs can be measured in needless 
spending, and the loss of valuable training time that should be focused on cultural 
awareness and language training, pre-mobilization tasks, and military occupational 
specialty training, among other essential training requirements.  
G. SHORT NOTIFICATION OF SOURCING HINDERS PROVIDING 
RESOURCES TO ARNG SF 
When receiving short notice requirements, units must adjust training plans to 
accommodate operational requirements and these training plans must be resourced 
appropriately, including reallocating and requesting resources to achieve readiness for 
mobilization under a compressed timeline. Units must also plan, coordinate and execute 
mobilization procedures. This requires time and manpower, which are both limited in the 
full-time manning of ARNG SF units. Short notice of sourcing increases the risk to 
mission and forces because training and readiness ultimately suffer, leaving forces less 
prepared. Placing units on an operational cycle enables units to synchronize training and 
resources around mobilizations and missions. As an example, if an ARNG SF unit 
receives short notification of operational sourcing at the beginning of the second quarter 
for a mobilization in the fourth quarter; the unit may already have completed weapon 
training for the year. The unit will have already used its ammunition allotment for the 
year and must resource additional ammunition to conduct required Special Forces 
Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC) training to meet pre-deployment 
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certification/validation requirements.  In the scope of resource management, acquiring 
multiple ammunition allotments and an additional training exercise is not a prudent use of 
limited resources and training. 
H. UNIT READINESS AND MOBILIZATION 
ARNG SF mobilizations are negatively affected by short notification of sourcing 
prior to deployment. Unanticipated sourcing results in reactionary efforts with little time 
for ARNG SF units to complete all the necessary pre-mobilization requirements. 
Therefore, upon mobilization, ARNG SF units encounter longer post mobilization 
training (PMT) in spite of the fact that DoD 1235.10 states that post mobilization training 
shall be minimized.91 A longer PMT requires more costly training at mobilization 
stations and reduces the operational deployment time. For example, when ARNG SF 
receive late notification for a mission outside the regional alignment, additional cultural 
awareness and language training is required in addition to medical, administrative, 
resources, schools, validation exercises and interoperability training with the gaining 
active component command. PMT generally occurs over a span of 90 days at a cost $2.5 
million for an ARNG SF battalion.92 With a force generation plan and consistent, 
predictable forecasting, ARNG SF units are able to accomplish many of the 
aforementioned requirements prior to mobilization reducing costs and post mobilization 
training thus maximizing deployment time in support of operational requirements.  
ARNG SF mobilizations are based upon unit readiness rather than an order of 
merit.93 The longer a unit goes without mobilization, the less likely it is that a unit will be 
mobilized. Units with high readiness levels are selected for mobilization above units that 
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do not have high readiness levels. Cross-leveling degrades ARNG SF manpower and 
training readiness, which prevents units from being selected for employment. This 
presents several problems. For instance, if a unit continually demonstrates low readiness 
in manning, training and equipment in quarterly unit strength reporting (USR), the unit is 
not selected for missions. As a result, when other units are sourced with a mission, 
personnel manning deficiencies are filled by units that are not deploying.  As a 
consequence, the non-deploying unit’s readiness further declines, making the unit less 
likely to be selected for future missions. One can see how this process can result in a 
spiral of decay resulting in a lack of unit and ARNG SF relevancy.  
The exception has become the rule for ARNG SF mobilizations. According to 
DoDD 1235.10, reserve component forces should be notified up to 24 months in advance 
of being considered for mobilization to maximize predictability and involuntary service. 
Mobilization orders should be produced as soon as operationally feasible. The standard 
for approval of RC mobilizations is no less than 180 days from the mobilization date.94 
In other words, ARNG SF units should receive notification of sourcing for mobilization 
up to 24 months prior to the mobilization date, enabling units to plan, train, resource and 
integrate with active component forces. On average, ARNG SF units receive notification 
of sourcing for mobilizations at or below the 180-day mark prescribed in DoDD 1235.10. 
Late notification limits the amount of time ARNG SF units and personnel have to 
integrate with the active component forces to achieve interoperability. Although ARNG 
SF units are expected to maintain operational readiness, the inconsistent predictability of 
operational deployments makes it difficult if not impossible to meet that readiness 
standard.  
I. CONCLUSION 
Utilizing a train-mobilize-deploy model for the employment of ARNG SF enables 
units to achieve the highest operational readiness with economical use of resources and 
training time. ARNG SF must have a force generation plan for providing resources, 
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allocating personnel, training, and equipment to ensure operational readiness.95 Providing 
consistent and predictable notification of sourcing directly affects stability and 
preparedness for families and civilian employers’ support for ARNG SF Soldiers. 
Furthermore, establishing operationally synchronized force generation plans decreases 
the post-mobilization training time thus reducing costs to services. ARNG SF has 
consistently demonstrated it is a capable, agile and ready force despite a myriad of 
training and resource challenges. Providing strategic guidance and implementing a force 
generation plan will increase ARNG SF efficiency and effectiveness reducing costs, 
decreasing stress to families and employers, and reducing operational stress to ARNG SF 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
After more than a decade of conflict demonstrating the high demand for U.S. 
Army Special Forces, the special operations community still has not developed a 
comprehensive “total force” plan integrating Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces 
into the operational picture. Active component Special Forces currently maintains an 
exhaustive operational tempo that is stressing the forces and their families, which in turn 
impacts the overall readiness and ability to respond to geographical combatant command 
(GCC) requirements. Incorporating Army National Guard Special Forces (ARNG SF) 
offers a remedy to this situation, yet these forces go unused with no satisfactory 
resolution in sight. ARNG SF is not optimally engaged in current operations, nor are 
these forces being considered for future operations, which is both an inexcusable 
oversight and a waste of existing capabilities.  
Building upon the findings in the 2012 RAND study, this study sought to identify 
ways of enhancing ARNG SF contributions by examining the factors inhibiting the 
proper utilization of ARNG SF as an operational force. This thesis examined five 
research questions centered on the requirements for ARNG SF as an operational force. 
First, how does the ARNG SF chain of command impact its readiness? Second, what 
inhibits ARNG SF from having consistent, predictable and continuous operational 
deployments in support of USSOCOM requirements? Third, what impact do current 
operational sourcing methods have on ARNG SF operational readiness? Fourth, does a 
lack of strategic guidance impact mobilization, training, and resources? The preceding 
chapters sought the answers to these questions and support the discussion of the factors 
that contribute to degraded ARNG SF readiness. This chapter answers the fifth research 
question: how can ARNG SF capabilities and readiness be improved?  
Understanding of the facts presented by this research has led to the following 
recommendations for improving ARNG SF’s ability to fully contribute to United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and United States Army Special Operations 
Command’s (USASOC) capabilities. First, develop strategic guidance for the utilization 
of ARNG SF as an operational force to enhance ARNG SF’s ability to fulfill USSOCOM 
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and USASOC strategic imperatives. Second, improve communication between the active 
component and ARNG SF through senior leader representation to optimize management 
of ARNG SF as an operational force. Third, USSOCOM and USASOC draft 
SOFORGEN plans must be amended to include ARNG SF. Fourth, fund additional 
“Special Forces Training Periods” (SFTPs) to improve ARNG SF capabilities and 
readiness. 
A. DEVELOP SPECIFIED STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR THE 
UTILIZATION OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES 
It is recommended that the current USSOCOM strategic directive be revised to 
incorporate clear guidance for the utilization of ARNG SF in the accomplishment of the 
SOF imperatives, including meeting GCC and theater special operations command 
(TSOC) operational sourcing needs. The persistent demands for SOF have precipitated 
tremendous strain on force and families. Using ARNG SF directly within the strategic 
imperatives facilitates SOF missions effectively with greater sustainability. 
Guidance must clearly identify operational requirements for ARNG SF to provide 
subordinate commands with direction thereby creating predictability for the active 
component and ARNG SF alike. Clear guidance is necessary to manage expectations and 
create accountability for both the active component and ARNG SF. Force generation 
plans must put ARNG SF into the operational cycle. Force management is the key to 
meeting the needs of the expanding global SOF network (GSN) campaign plan 
(CAMPLAN) requirements. Maximizing the use of a force already built and available 
will reduce stress on the active component while preserving skills, experience and 
manpower in the ARNG SF Groups. 
Eliminating ambiguity and generating direct guidance will establish clear 
expectations for leaders, giving ARNG SF the ability to anticipate requirements. The 
active component Special Forces are striving to meet a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio, 
while ARNG SF should be projected in a 1:5 ratio, improving predictability for both 
components. Providing direction for the operational use of ARNG SF needs a top down 
approach to be successful. Strategic direction should include placing ARNG SF within 
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the force generation cycle and establishing a train-mobilize-deploy model to direct 
training and resources as per DoDD 1235.10. It is further recommended that senior 
National Guard and ARNG SF leaders have representation in the development of 
strategic directives for ARNG Special Forces. Together, Title 32 and Title 10 leaders 
must provide clear guidance for the employment of ARNG SF.  
Using the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, USSOCOM, USASOC, 
National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the 17 SOF states that have ARNG SF contingents 
need to develop a “how to” manual for employment of ARNG SF. Developing such 
guidance must be a collaborative effort focused on Title 32 and Title 10 roles and 
responsibilities for operational sourcing, training, funding and titling authorities, 
allocating resources and mobilization. Guidance should be developed by USSOCOM and 
NGB with input from subordinate commands providing overarching guidance for 
integrating ARNG SF with the active component as an operational force. Lines of 
communication and semi-annual force generation planning conferences should also be 
established. Conferences should identify ARNG SF deployment sourcing requirements, 
focus on resolving force generation issues and synchronize Title 10 and Title 32 
commands to better support ARNG SF. Synchronizing requires increasing 
communication and collaboration.   
B. IMPROVING COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ACTIVE COMPONENT 
SPECIAL FORCES AND ARNG SF THROUGH SENIOR LEADER 
REPRESENTATION 
Title 10 and Title 32 command hierarchies share in the responsibilities for 
training, allocating resources, mobilizing, deploying and reconstituting ARNG SF; 
however, lack of communication and synchronization between these hierarchies hinders 
the operational employment and readiness for ARNG SF. Title 32 and Title 10 command 
structures have different policies, programs, concepts, plans and missions. Vertical and 
lateral communication must improve to synchronize the dual command structure, prevent 
parallel lines of effort, and deconflict overlapping responsibilities to best support ARNG 
SF. Improving vertical communication requires commanders and staff of SOF states to 
communicate with ARNG SF leadership to gain greater understanding of issues hindering 
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readiness. Energizing the Special Operations Advisory Council (SOFAC), comprised of 
colonels from each SOF state, through quarterly working groups will provide TAGs with 
greater insight concerning ARNG SF issues. This is a Title 32 solution to enhancing 
ARNG SF awareness that will enable SOF TAGs to advocate ARNG SF needs. It is also 
recommended that the Title 10 command structure include ARNG SF leadership in active 
component SOF planning and coordination meetings. ARNG SF should also participate 
in USSOCOM and USASOC sourcing conferences to increase awareness of ARNG SF 
capabilities and issues as well as to facilitate consistent and predictable operational 
deployment sourcing. Ideally, ARNG SF O5 and O6 commands would be represented as 
well as NGB staff.   
Overlapping responsibilities necessitate enhancing lateral communication to 
achieve greater synchronization between Title 32 and Title 10 commands. During 
interviews, communication between Title 32 and Title 10 commands was identified as a 
deficiency demanding improvement.96 Commanders and staff need to communicate to 
develop a common understanding of how and why ARNG SF will be incorporated as an 
operational force. Furthermore, communication between Title 10 and Title 32 commands 
is necessary to result in a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities for efficiently 
and effectively accomplishing objectives and enable ARNG SF. Communication is 
necessary to maximize the use of limited resources and prevent parallel lines of effort. 
Increasing communication between Title 10 and Title 32 commands and staff will further 
increase cooperation through the establishment of habitual relationships between 
commands.     
                                                 
96 Brett W. Haeussler (Colonel, Senior National Guard Advisor, United States Special Operations 
Command), interview by author, September 20, 2013; Michael D. Torello (Colonel, Senior National Guard 
Advisor. United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013; 
Randall M. Zeegers (Colonel, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Forces 
Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013; David A. Troutman (GS-14, Deputy Chief of 
Operations, G33, United States Army Special Operations Command), interview by author, September 24, 
2013; Jason W. Trommer (Major, Mobilization Officer, United States Army Special Operations 
Command), interview by author, September 23, 2013. 
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According to Zeegers,  “It’s not always about command relationships; it’s about 
relationships between commanders.”97 This statement illustrates a key point that is 
lacking when it comes to the use of ARNG SF. Title 10 and Title 32 commands must 
strengthen relationships between commanders and staff through routine communication 
and collaboration. ARNG SF states must increase communication efforts to gain greater 
understanding of problems affecting ARNG SF in maintaining readiness. USSOCOM 
and USASOC must incorporate ARNG SF states and NGB into planning and sourcing 
processes. ARNG SF also needs to provide the active component greater understanding 
of the unique challenges and limitations inherent to a part-time force. Because ARNG SF 
is not the active component, Title 32 and Title 10 commands must improve 
communication to establish and maintain relationships to achieve greater interoperability 
and generate awareness of the challenges the part-time force faces in maintaining 
operational readiness.    
C. SOFORGEN PLANS MUST INCLUDE ARNG SF 
Operational cycles for ARNG SF should be established in accordance with 
USSOCOM initiatives and DoD directives to meet the GCC manpower requirements, 
provide predictability and preserve force and families. First, USSOCOM’s Draft 
SOFORGEN directive and USASOCs SOFORGEN concept must be amended to include 
ARNG SF. This is absolutely essential to enhancing ARNG SF contributions. Second, 
once amended to include RC SOF, SOFORGEN should be approved by USSOCOM and 
USASOC, and then implemented by Title 32 and Title 10 commands. Once amended and 
approved, USASOC must source ARNG SF with consistent and predictable operational 
requirements. The draft SOFORGEN plan will provide a sequencing of sourcing to 
project requirements three years in advance to establish a 1:2 dwell time for active 
component Special Forces.  Adding ARNG SF to the SOFORGEN plan will expand the 
force pool, while enabling USSOCOM to fulfill requirements that are currently not 
sourced. Identifying operational requirements for ARNG SF in accordance with the 
prescribed timelines in the draft USSOCOM and USASOC SOFORGEN plans will allow 
                                                 
97 Randall M. Zeegers (Colonel, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Special Forces 
Command), interview by author, September 24, 2013. 
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ample time to project funding using 12304(b), eliminating the need for USSOCOM and 
USASOC to fund ARNG SF missions with sustainment dollars. 
 
Figure 3.  ARNG SF SOFORGEN Force Pool 
Figure 3 illustrates a proposed SOFORGEN force pool for ARNG SF based upon 
the active component force pool plan in the draft SOFORGEN directive. Figure 3 places 
the six ARNG SF battalions on a 1:5 dwell time ratio enabling ARNG SF to supply one 
battalion of operationally ready forces every year to meet GCC requirements. The 
proposed SOFORGEN Force Pool further enables ARNG SF to provide scalable 
manpower solutions with trained and ready companies, operational detachments, and 
support contingents. Developing the SOFORGEN plan for ARNG SF will also reduce the 
need for feasibility assessments, where 12304(b) funding cannot be used to source, as 
these are emerging requirements. One battalion of ARNG SF will be in the queue with 
funds projected. Moreover, incorporating this plan will enable ARNG SF to maximize 
limited training time and resources by placing ARNG SF units in a train-mobilize-deploy  
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cycle to produce operationally ready forces. Structured training through a force 
generation plan will increase readiness within units and encourages the use of an order-
of-merit cycle for deploying ARNG SF units.  
Including ARNG SF in the proposed SOFORGEN plan at inception will provide a 
clearer picture in the outcome of a total force generation plan. The benefits to active 
component and ARNG SF alike include reduced stress on forces and families as well as 
increased readiness, interoperability and optimization of manpower, while the ultimate 
results will be the achievement of USSOCOM and USASOCs imperatives and meeting 
the needs of GCCs. 
D. SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING PERIODS WILL ENHANCE 
CAPABILITIES AND READINESS 
Introducing additional training periods for ARNG SF is a solution to enhancing 
operational readiness in ARNG SF. While this recommendation adds to the time 
commitment of the Soldier, funding pay and allowances offsets potential civilian 
employer income loss and incentivizes family support. A similar program has long been 
established for Army aviators since National Guard aviators are required to maintain the 
same readiness levels (RL) as Active Duty aviators. To understand how a similar 
program for ARNG SF would increase readiness, a snapshot of the National Guard 
aviation program is necessary. In order to maintain the flying standards, ARNG Aviators 
maintain RL standards with an additional allocation of 72 flight-training periods (AFTPs) 
per year. Like UTAs, AFTPs are four-hour periods of time the ARNG Aviation 
community uses to gain and maintain proficiency and readiness. Rated Army National 
Guard Aviators, flight surgeons, non-aviator crew members on flight status are 
authorized to use the additional AFTPs. 
State Army Aviation Officers have greater management flexibility in this program 
and are encouraged to use it to meet the aviation training readiness requirements.98 
Providing ARNG SF with additional training periods, or “Special Forces training 
                                                 
98 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Regulation (NGR) 350-1: Army National Guard Training 
(Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2009), 11–12; National Guard Bureau, Supplement 1 to AR 95-1, 
Aviation Flight Regulations (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2011), 29.   
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periods” (SFTP), would enable ARNG SF personnel to remain proficient in individual 
and collective Special Forces training requirements. SFTPs offer a solution for 
maintaining language proficiency, driver training, airborne training, planning and 
coordination meetings, and other training exercises. Additional information on AFTPs 
can be found by referencing chapter eleven of National Guard supplement one to AR 95-
1, Aviation Flight Regulations. The long-range benefits of establishing an SFTP program 
for individual and collective unit readiness will improve capabilities and unit readiness. 
Additionally, SFTPs will provide additional funding resources to strengthen 
interoperability between ARNG SF and the active component. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Army National Guard Special Forces can be a key contributor to the SOF total 
force approach in achieving national strategic objectives over the next decade. Enabling 
ARNG SF to contribute to the accomplishment of SOCOM 2020 and ARSOF 2022 goals 
requires improvements to managing and directing the use of ARNG SF to ensure 
inclusion in the operational picture. Change is difficult and effecting change after a plan 
is already in place compounds the challenge. Consequently, developing a plan for ARNG 
SF at the inception of SOF force generation planning is imperative to enable USSOCOM 
to optimize the use of all special operations forces.  
The benefits to ARNG SF readiness, training, and allocation of resources are 
clear, while the additional benefits of stability and predictability are also critical to 
preserving families and civilian employers. ARNG SF have civilian experiences, skills, 
and capabilities that provide unique depth to U.S. Special Forces. Neglecting to 
incorporate ARNG SF forces in USSOCOM and USASOC force generation planning and 
not providing ARNG SF with strategic guidance fails to meet total force objectives and 
underutilizes a proven resource. Additionally, it reduces unit and Soldier readiness and is 
not cost effective.  Overcoming the barriers identified in this study is essential to 
preserving the capabilities and readiness of U.S. Special Forces. The recommendations 
presented in this research project will enhance contributions of all U.S. Special Forces. 
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